The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable by Shaw, Bill
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 33
Issue 3 2000 Article 9
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny:
Morally Unassailable
Bill Shaw
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shaw, Bill (2000) "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 33:
Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol33/iss3/9
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
Progeny: Morally Unassailable
Bill Shaw*
Introduction ..................................................... 689
I. Effects of International Bribery on Emerging Nations ..... 691
II. FCPA and Progeny: International Efforts to Curb Bribery . 694
A. Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development Initiatives ................................ 696
B. Organization of American States ....................... 698
C. Other International Efforts ............................ 699
D. Transparency International ............................ 700
UII. Critics of the FCPA ....................................... 700
IV. The FCPA in Court: Augmenting the Act's Transparency .. 702
V. Justification for Anti-Corruption Measures ................ 706
Conclusion ...................................................... 708
Introduction
While opponents avow that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' is morally
assailable, a growing number of supporters believe that the U.S.-led effort
to reduce corruption in the global economic arena is a positive initiative,
not a candidate for indictment as "moral imperialism." 2 At worst, it
amounts to a unilateral disarmament, 3 specifically, a commercial unilat-
eral disarmament by economic leaders who project a long-term vision,
undaunted by the consequences of competing against cheaters. These
cheaters are corrupt corporate executives, afraid to compete on an even
playing field.4 Bribe-paying corporate officers represent the personifica-
* Woodson Centennial Professor, Legal Studies in Business, University of Texas.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1994))
[hereinafter FCPA].
2. Steven Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 261 (1997); see also Kenneth U.
Surjadinata, Comment, Revisiting Corrupt Practices from a Market Perspective, 12 EMORY
INT'L L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (1998). For further detail, see discussion infra Part III.
3. For the first time, U.S. interests in foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures may
come under scrutiny from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and Organization of American States (OAS). See Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21,
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, at V (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention]; Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, Specialized Conference on the Draft Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 27-29, 1996, Caracas, Venezuela [here-
inafter Inter-American Corruption Convention or OAS Convention].
4. The U.S. effort to create a level playing field is not acclaimed in all quarters of
the globe. "Adopting such laws [as the FCPA] would result in a loss of lucrative con-
33 CORNELL IrrN'L L.J. 689 (2000)
Cornell International Law Journal
tion of Oliver Williamson's "opportunist," who pursues self-interest with
guile.5
This Article endeavors to show that the FCPA has provided much-
needed leadership in international economics and through its persever-
ance, the United States has gained strong multinational support. Undoubt-
edly, the United States and its supporters would have received criticism
from many quarters if they had not assumed leadership in confronting an
issue that is devastating to the development of the global economy. 6 The
FCPA has not crippled U.S. firms in global trade, though well-documented
evidence of lost contracts exists.7 The FCPA pays dividends both domesti-
cally, through more efficient firms and more responsible management, 8
and transnationally, especially in emergent economies.9  General
Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria and co-chairman of Transparency
International's advisory council, stated that bribery may be disguised as
gifts and laws forbidding bribery may be culturally intrusive. 10
tracts to 'deep pocketed' American companies ... " A. Rushdi Siddiqui, Corruption
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, § 3, at 40.
5. See OLivER E. WILLIAMSON, TiE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 30 (1985).
6. The Speaker of the South African Parliament, noting "that international corrup-
tion is often tacitly supported and actively encouraged by Western countries," related
that "attributing corruption to our [African] cultures is both arrogant and racist, as well
as convenient and self-serving." Anver Versi, On Corruption and Corrupters, AiR. Bus.,
Nov. 1996, at 7 (quoting Dr. Frene Ginwalla, Speaker of the South African Parliament).
The significance of bribe suppliers to the spread of transnational bribery prompted the
most prominent nongovernmental organization dealing with bribery to publish an index
ranking countries in terms of the frequency with which their citizens offer bribes. See
Transparency International, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Mar. 25, 2000) <http://
www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/faqs97.htm>.
7. During a four-year period beginning May 1994, U.S. officials alleged that bribery
influenced 239 international contracts totaling $108 billion. See Glenn R. Simpson, For-
eign Deals Rely on Bribes, U.S. Contends, WALL ST.J., Feb. 23, 1999, at A3. To date, there
is no definitive study attributing these losses to U.S. trade. See Daniel Pines, Comment,
Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 185, 208 (1994). United Technologies Corporation took a hard-nose approach.
After its president fired the chief executive of a foreign subsidiary for violating the FCPA,
he related:
Market share and profitability stayed up and even increased and, after a year or
two of tenacious effort, we were able to shorten our long, long overdue collection
period on government receivables in one of the more notorious problem coun-
tries. Those early experiences taught me that the only way to run our business
is with the most rigorous and demanding standards of compliance with law and
regulations.
Benjamin B. Klubes & Roberto Iraola, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Compliance
Primer for American Businesses in an Era of Trade Globalization, 33 CORP. CouNs. Q. 35,
45 (1998).
8. See Skip Kaltenheuser, The Real Cost of Doing Business: Ignorance Is No Protection,
WORLD TRADE, June 1997, at 80.
9. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
229, 233 (1999) (discussing the significance of "emerging economies" to the global
economy and presenting a theory of emerging economies, which attempts to address the
phrase "emergent economy," distinguishing it from "emerging markets," "transition
economies," and "developing countries").
10. See Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the
Americas, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 196, 209 (1999) ("[A] gift is given in public openly,
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This paper advances the position that the FCPA and progeny-conven-
tions generated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD)" and the Organization of American States (OAS) 12 -
promote the efforts of economies entering the world market; reinforce the
industrial, financial, and political institutions of emerging and transitional
regimes; and restrain the conduct of firms from the United States and other
signatory nations that may be tempted to erode the limits of responsible
market principles. The FCPA and progeny will play a significant role as
components of an on-going effort to expand the global free market and
bring stable democracies to the forefront.
Part I identifies the devastating effects of bribery on emerging nations
and the proposed substantial benefits that these countries might reap from
international efforts to reduce corrupt practices. Part II discusses the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act and recent international efforts to address the
problem of international bribery, specifically emphasizing that the United
States is no longer the lone adversary of corrupt practices. Part III
addresses the arguments advanced by critics that describe these efforts as
"moral imperialism" and advance the idea that market efficiency will rem-
edy the problem without legal efforts. Part IV highlights recent cases
involving prosecution under the FCPA and how these cases augment the
transparency of the FCPA. Part V addresses justifications for anti-corrup-
tion measures.
I. Effects of International Bribery on Emerging Nations
In purely economic terms, corruption is not cost-effective or profitable; it
costs emerging economies, developed economies, and private concerns a
great deal of money. 13 For emergent economies unable to absorb many of
the costs and consequences of distorted markets, corruption is an espe-
cially pressing problem.14 For example, in 1997, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank together suspended over $250 million
and bribery is given illicitly and secretly, and not to insult [my] people by saying that
they couldn't tell the difference."). Another African leader, Ayodele Aderinwale, project
manager for the African Leadership Forum, addressed the matter as follows:
On the issue of giving somebody a gift, the gift is usually very small. It is a
token. It is offered, it is not demanded; it is done in the open; and when it is too
big, it becomes an embarrassment and it is returned immediately .... And
people talk about bribery as being part of the African culture .... They perceive
the typical African as a big thief.... These are some of the fallacies people bring
up in order to justify their own corrupt practices.
Ayodele Aderinwale, Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in Africa, Keynote
Address to the African Leadership Forum on Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights
in Africa, Cotonou, Benin (Sept. 1994).
11. See OECD Convention, supra note 3.
12. See Inter-American Corruption Convention, supra note 3.
13. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 QJ. ECON. 681, 700-04 (1995)
(showing a significant negative relationship between corruption and investment, as well
as growth, in both a statistical and economic sense).
14. See Michael Kantor, National Export Strategy, Towards the Next American Century:
A U.S. Strategic Response to Foreign Competitive Practices, Bus. Am., Sept. 1996, at 112.
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in loans to Kenya because of the country's inability and refusal to address
bribery issues within its government.15 Further, since "emerging econo-
mies have become among the most dynamic, most influential, and there-
fore among the most watched components of the global economy,
fluctuations in [their] fortunes . . measurably affect the global
economy."16
Efforts against transnational and international bribery are not a prod-
uct of moral imperialism, but rather a product of economic forces. The
force behind the U.S. push for international efforts to curb bribery was a
need to level the playing field between American bidders who were subject
to the FCPA, and their foreign counterparts, who were not bound by any
laws forbidding illicit payments. Yet whether U.S. efforts were spurred by
"moral imperialism" or the simple need to improve business opportunities,
bribery's effects on emerging nations are numerous, and current interna-
tional efforts greatly alleviate some of those problems.
As the marketplace becomes increasingly global, the relationships
between participants become more important, and bribery affects those
relationships on an intergovernmental, commercial, and democratic
level. 17 For instance, bribery undermines and corrodes governments by
hampering the decision-making process because bribed government offi-
cials will not make contract decisions based on price and work quality, but
on unrelated financial gain.' 8 Furthermore, a government overrun with
corruption tends to drive out the honest officials, leaving only the dishon-
est.19 This decision-making process distorts prices because it channels
more money to the government than the government actually spends on
public good. Therefore, corruption reduces incentives to complete projects
because more resources are utilized to pay bribes, and it reduces outside
investment because investors are unwilling to participate where corrupt
governments exist.20 Bribery also undermines democracies by effectively
relating to the public that the government is for sale.21 Corruption further
undermines governments by suggesting that bribes will undo attempts to
accomplish societal goals.22
More specifically, transnational corruption and bribery unnecessarily
increase prices, reward bad management, 23 and result in self-serving gov-
15. See James P. Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption
Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption
Eruption May Be Capped, 18 Nw. J. Iwr'L L. & Bus. 498, 517 (1998).
16. Nichols, supra note 9, at 231.
17. See Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
451, 459 (1999).
18. See id. at 464.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 465-66.
21. See id. at 468.
22. See id. at 469.
23. SeeJulie B. Nesbit, Note, Transnational Bribery of Foreign Officials: A New Threat
to the Future of Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1273, 1275 (1998).
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ernment policies.24 Corruption usurps resources, 25 leaving emergent
economies incapable of achieving optimal growth.26 Even more troubling
in the developing world, bribery's distributional ill-effects tend to lower
income on a national scale, increase debt,27 and augment the inequality
between the rich and the poor.28
Indeed, by increasing prices and encouraging bad behavior and poor
management, 29 "corruption can endanger the use of economic choices,
increase the costs of transactions, reduce state revenue, increase public
expenditure, penalize law abiders and produce adverse distributional
effects."30 Companies then pass these "unofficial" costs onto already bur-
dened consumers.31 As the bribe demand rises in relation to the expected
earnings of the goods or services to be produced, certain consequences
follow. "To avoid losing the valuable foreign contract, the supplier may
have to increase the product's price, accept a lower gross profit margin, and
reduce the quality of his product to achieve cost savings."'3 2
An increase in the rate charged in transnational bribes over the last
several years33 also provides an incentive for the suppliers of bribes to curb
corruption. 34 As a spokesman for Transparency International noted, what
once was a 10% rate has now mushroomed into a 30% rate in many coun-
tries. 35 During the past three years, the U.S. Department of Commerce
concluded that foreign companies have illicitly influenced almost 180 com-
mercial contracts worth nearly $80 billion.36 The World Bank surveyed
3600 companies in sixty-nine countries and found that about forty percent
pay bribes.37 Ultimately, an economic system that condones corruption
suffers from impoverished decision-making, and the misallocation of
scarce government resources results in a host of political and social
problems38 irrespective of ideology.39
24. See id. at 1275.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1290.
28. See id. at 1292-93.
29. See id. at 1279.
30. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Fourteenth International Symposium on Economic Crime:
Corruption- The Enemy Within: Corruption-A General Review with an Emphasis on the
Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 460-61 (1997).
31. See id. at 457, 461, 463.
32. Nesbit, supra note 23, at 1280.
33. See id. at 1278.
34. See id. at 1276.
35. See id. at 1278 (quoting Michael Wiehen of Transparency International).
36. See id. at 1278-79.
37. See J. Lee Johnson, A Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some
Facts Worth Knowing, 63 Mo. L. REv. 979, 979 (1998).
38. See Jay Bryan, Corruption Clogs the Gears of Industry, GAzETT- (Montreal), Apr.
15, 1999, at D1. Bryan refers to the work of Vito Tani at the International Monetary
Fund. Tani contributed to a book edited by ArvindJain, Professor of Finance at Concor-
dia University, Economics of Corruption. Referring to Jain's work, Bryan wrote:
[Tlhe truly hurtful form of corruption, in his view, is the policy corruption that
occurs when governments distort major economic policies for the benefit of a
few political and business leaders .... If there is one key lesson to be drawn
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Moreover, allowing companies to deduct illicit payments as business
expenses reduces essential, and often already modest, national treasuries,
thereby undercutting public services and forcing the tax burden onto indi-
vidual citizens who cannot afford it and resent paying more than their "fair
share."40 This process degrades the public trust in the nation's tax sys-
tem4 ' and the government generally. Social structures are eroded,42 as
their foundations-loyalty and trust-erode.
The political and human costs of corruption are also staggering.
Research over the past six years demonstrates that corrupt systems are not
only unjust, but inherently unstable.43 This instability is especially prob-
lematic for governments and economies transitioning to democracy or mar-
ket economies or both. "Because bribes must be paid in secret, normal
systems of checks and balances do not function."44 Systems without
accountability or stability are unpredictable, so prudent investors often
reject them in favor of more predictable, sound systems.
In this context, the FCPA's extraterritorial reach in no way constitutes
moral imperialism or breach of sovereignty. Although the criminalization
of transnational bribery will reach conduct outside U.S. territory, it only
proscribes the illegal conduct of "domestic concerns," U.S. citizens and
permanent residents, and U.S. corporations and officers, directors, employ-
ees, agents, and stockholders. 45 FCPA case law demonstrates that the
United States has narrowly and rigorously prosecuted FCPA violations.
The FCPA comports with accepted principles of international law while
also improving the global business culture and facilitating the entrance of
emerging economies into the world market.
II. FCPA and Progeny: International Efforts to Curb Bribery
Watergate and the eclipse of the Nixon administration sparked the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act's passage in 1977.46 The crises of legitimacy and
illegality emanating from the White House led investigators down an evi-
dentiary trail of extensive political corruption.47 As a result, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered a number of corporate slush
from the research, Jain suggests, it is that it is a mistake to focus on the wide-
spread problem of bribery that attracts the most attention from business and the
media.
Id.
39. See id.
40. Nesbit, supra note 23, at 1281.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1292-94.
43. See John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption, FOREIGN
Aw'., 1998, at 17, 17-18.
44. Id. at 21.
45. See Nichols, supra note 9, at 290.
46. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts
Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (1999).
47. See id.
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funds, many of which were ased to bribe foreign officials.48
The extent of the corporate and political corruption was much more
expansive than anticipated, a true crisis in the American system. Recogniz-
ing the need to curb corporate and political corruption, Congress unani-
mously and virtually without debate passed the FCPA.49 The Act placed
48. See Johnson, supra note 37, at 980.
49. Since the passage in 1977 the FCPA has undergone several changes to comply
with global initiatives set by the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Some highlights of the FCPA's
history include:
- FPCA 1977-The FCPA is divided into two parts: the anti-bribery provisions, which
the Department of Justice enforces, and the accounting requirements, which the
Securities and Exchange Commission enforces.
The anti-bribery section prohibits direct and indirect bribery of foreign officials by
issuers, firms, and domestic concerns, including business entities and U.S. residents.
The basic anti-bribery prohibition criminalizes attempts to influence an official to
assist the individual or business in maintaining or acquiring business. The FCPA also
covers payments to intermediaries when the individual knows that the payment will
be given to a foreign official. The knowing intent requirement has been interpreted to
include "conscious disregard."
The accounting provisions apply only to issuers under the SEC's jurisdiction. The
provisions originated as Amendments to the SEC Act of 1934. They require record-
keeping practices to reflect honestly and transparently the actual accounts of the busi-
ness entity.
1988 Amendments-In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA. Under the Amendments,
Congress tightened the intent requirement so that a defendant could be convicted
only for actual knowledge of the payment's or gift's intended results. The intent
requirement could be satisfied where there was "conscious purpose to avoid learning
the truth."
Congress also included a better definition of facilitating payments, viewed as excep-
tions to the FCPA. Facilitating payments are those payments made for "routine gov-
ernmental actions." Congress provided affirmative defenses for defendants. If a
defendant could prove that the payment was lawful under the written laws or regula-
tions of the country or that the payment was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure,
their actions were not subject to conviction.
Penalties for the anti-bribery provisions depend on the type of defendant and range
from $1,000,000 for firms to $100,000 for individuals. The imprisonment term is
five years.
Congress also tightened the accounting provisions with a stricter intent require-
ment of actual knowledge. Congress added a better definition of corporate responsi-
bilities, involving the record-keeping of subsidiaries, and better clarification of record-
keeping standards overall.
Civil penalties for violating the FCPA's accounting provisions depend on the "egre-
giousness of the violation." Fines can range from $5000 to $500,000. Other reme-
dies include actions in equity such as injunctions, cease and desist orders, and fines
imposed under other federal regulations.
1998 Amendments-The 1998 Amendments came in response to the United States
adoption of the OECD Convention. On November 10, 1998, President Clinton signed
the International Antibribery and Fair Competition Act. The Act expanded some of
the FCPA's basic definitions. For instance, Congress broadened the definition of brib-
ery to include any payment made to secure "any improper advantage"-language from
the OECD Convention. The definition of public official now includes officials of
"public international organizations," such as the World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund.
The jurisdictional provision was also changed to comply with worldwide efforts.
Jurisdiction is no longer based on interstate commerce, but on the nationality princi-
ple. This expansion now means that U.S. nationals acting entirely outside the United
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the United States at the forefront of the nascent effort to stamp out
corruption.50
Recent initiatives worldwide have increased the pace of efforts to
address bribery and corruption across the globe. The two most important
acts in this area have been the conventions created by the OECD and the
OAS.
A. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Initiatives
In November 1997, the OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The
member countries and five non-member states signed the Convention, obli-
gating themselves to implement and ratify the Convention as national legis-
lation by December 31, 1998.51 After a complex ratification process, the
Convention became effective on February 15, 1999.52
In addition, the OECD established working groups to investigate and
propose steps to deal with bribery. Another working group deals with the
few States that still allow a tax deduction for bribery payments.5 3
The OECD Convention obligates signatory countries to follow its rec-
ommendations and implement its guidelines into their own statutes and
laws. Under Article I, each member state must take all measures necessary
to criminalize bribes given, offered, or promised, either directly or indi-
rectly, to a foreign public official to obtain any "improper advantage."5 4
However, much like the FCPA, the Convention has an exception for
States can still be convicted for violations of the FCPA. Jurisdiction over any person
acting "in whole or in part" within the territory of the United States is also subject to
the FCPA provisions regardless of their nationality.
For full treatment of the FCPA, see George, supra note 46, at 6-13; see also Gary Eisen-
berg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 AM. CraM. L. REv. 595 (2000).
50. See Johnson, supra note 37, at 981; see also Salbu, supra note 2, at 231.
51. See George, supra note 46, at 36. The OECD Convention came on the heels of a
1994 Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Bribery in International Transac-
tions. The twenty-nine OECD members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. See OECD Online, Membership (visited Nov. 10, 2000) <http://
www.oecd.org/about/general/membercountries.htm>. The five non-member countries
that signed the Convention were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak
Republic. See OECD Online, Anti-Corruption Unit, Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions - Text of the Convention (visited Nov. 10,
2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocurruption/20novle.htm>.
52. See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 380 (2000). The ratification process required ratification by
five of the ten OECD countries with the greatest volume of exports, representing at least
60% of the total exports of the top ten countries for the Convention to take effect. As
contingency, the Convention would become effective when at least two signatory coun-
tries submitted their instruments of ratification. See id.
53. See George, supra note 46, at 35-36.
54. OECD Convention, supra note 3; see also Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler,
Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't? The OECD Convention and the Globalization of
Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VnD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1249, 1304 (1999).
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"grease" or facilitating payments. 55 The Convention not only addresses the
crime of bribery but also other crimes related to its commission, including
attempt and conspiracy.56 It covers a broad range of "foreign officials" to
include any person holding a legislative, administrative, or judicial office in
a foreign country, appointed or elected; any person exercising a public
function in a foreign country; and any official or agent of a public interna-
tional organization.57
The Convention provides alternate provisions for the exercise of juris-
diction on the basis of either territoriality or nationality.58 Under the Con-
vention, a signatory must exercise jurisdiction over an individual when the
offence is committed in whole or in part within its territory or the offence
is committed by one of its nationals regardless of territory.5 9 To further
aid in the conviction of offenders, the Convention obligates mutual legal
assistance including answering requests for documents (sometimes regard-
less of national bank secrecy laws), making individuals available for inves-
tigation, and transferring custody without formal extradition
proceedings. 60 In fact, the Convention makes bribery an extraditable
offense and requires those countries that do not extradite to prosecute the
individual under their own laws.61
Article VIII of the OECD Convention also provides for accounting
transparency by requiring signatories to create regulations for the mainte-
nance of business records and accounts to prevent hidden payments. 62
One concern for the Convention's success, however, is the fact that it does
not obligate member countries to eliminate tax deductions for foreign brib-
ery payments. 63 As noted earlier, a working group has been established to
address this concern, and it is likely that all of the member countries will
soon enact legislation prohibiting such tax deductions. 64
As of late October 1999, all but sixteen of the member countries had
55. See Corr & Lawler, supra note 54, at 1304 (describing grease payments as those
made simply to "induce government officials to perform their routine governmental
functions").
56. See OECD Convention, supra note 3, art. I; Corr & Lawler, supra note 54, at
1305.
57. See OECD Convention, supra note 3, art. I, § 4.
58. See id. art. IV; see also, David Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Brib-
ery: The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 NW. J. IN'L L. & Bus.
457, 487 (1998).
59. See Gantz, supra note 58, at 487.
60. See Corr & Lawler, supra note 54, at 1308.
61. See id.
62. See OECD Convention, supra note 3; see also Corr & Lawler, supra note 54, at
1308.
63. See OECD Convention, supra note 3, arts. XI, X.
64. See Gantz, supra note 58, at 493. In addition, most of the countries including
Germany, Belgium, and Canada, have enacted legislation prohibiting the deduction of
bribes as business expenses. See OECD Online, Anti-Corruption Ring Online, Law Regu-
lation of Corrupt Practices: OECD Member Countries (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/law/oecd.htm>.
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ratified the Convention. 65 As part of its efforts to ensure that the intent
and actions of the Convention are carried out, the OECD investigates each
signatory country to check adherence and publish progress reports. 66
Also, the OECD has enacted monitoring procedures to evaluate whether
signatory countries enacted legislation in compliance with the
Convention. 67
B. Organization of American States
The OAS Convention, entered into force on March 6, 1997, was the first
international agreement designed to address international corruption. 68
All thirty five members of the OAS have signed the Convention, but only
twenty have ratified the agreement.69
The Inter-American Convention is similar to the OECD in several
respects, but most important is how the OAS Convention differs from the
OECD Convention. Unlike the OECD Convention, the OAS Convention
addresses the demand side as well as the supply side of international brib-
ery by requiring member states to criminalize the solicitation and accept-
ance of illicit payments. 70 The OAS Convention also prohibits "illicit
enrichment," which means that unexplainable significant increases in a
government official's wealth are considered corruption. 71
In addition, unlike the OECD Convention, the OAS Convention pro-
vides no explicit exception for "grease payments."72 In fact, OAS Conven-
tion's language suggests that the Convention's scope may be much broader
than that of the OECD Convention. For example, while the OECD Conven-
tion prohibits payments to secure "any improper advantage," 73 Article 6,
§ 1(a) and (b) limit the prohibition to anything of value given in exchange
for "any act or omission in the performance of the official's public func-
65. See Corr & Lawler, supra note 54, at 1320; see also OECD Online, Anti-Corrup-
tion Ring Online, Law Regulation of Corrupt Practices: OECD Member Countries (visited
Nov. 10, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/noncorruptionweb/law/oecd.htm> (linking
to legislation in each of the signatory states regarding bribery laws).
66. See OECD Convention, supra note 3, art. XII.
67. All countries to the Convention are to have been evaluated by Spring of 2000.
For a complete schedule of evaluations and monitoring procedures, see OECD Online,
The Monitoring Procedure (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
nocorruption>.
68. See Gantz, supra note 58, at 476.
69. See Organization of American States, B-58: Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (visited Dec. 10, 2000) <http://www.oas.org/juridicio/english/sigs/b-
58.html>. The twenty-six signatory countries are Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
Organization of American States, B-58: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(visited Nov. 10, 2000), available at <http://www.oas.org/juridicio/english/sigs/b-
58.html>.
70. See Gantz, supra note 58, at 478.
71. See Inter-American Corruption Convention, supra note 3, art. VI, § 1(a), IX; see
also Gantz, supra note 58, at 479.
72. Gantz, supra note 58, at 480.
73. OECD Convention, supra note 3, art. I, § 1.
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tion."74 Without an explicit exception for facilitating payments, it would
seem that the OAS Convention's language prohibits even those payments.
This expansive definition of bribery might seem too intrusive, possibly
explaining why the United States has not ratified this Convention.
C. Other International Efforts
Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have taken
efforts to address corruption and bribery in the international market. For
instance, the World Bank, in an effort to reduce the use of bank funds for
illicit payments, revised its Procurement and Consultant Guidelines to
include a specific section on fraud and corruption. This section requires
borrowers and other parties to World Bank contracts to adhere to the "high-
est degree of ethics" in carrying out the contract.7 5
In addition, the Guidelines' revisions include specific instances where
the World Bank will reject or cancel all or part of a contract if it finds that
corruption was involved at any point in the contract.76 The World Bank
has stated that loan proposals and applications will be rejected if it finds
that the borrower or the beneficiary is or has engaged in corrupt prac-
tices.77 The World Bank has also expressed an intention to investigate,
using its own auditors, the contractors' and suppliers' records in connec-
tion with the fulfillment of contracts funded by World Bank money. In
fact, the World Bank now requires procurement contracts to have specific
provisions giving the World Bank the authority to inspect parties' contract-
related records. 78 If the World Bank finds corrupt activity, the transgressor
may be barred from future World Bank contracts. 79
Aside from the agencies' regulatory practices, the IMF and the World
Bank have also offered voluntary recommendations for inclusion in con-
tracts that they draft. For instance, the World Bank's Procurement and
Consultant Guidelines provide a pledge against bribery. However, the bor-
rowing government must request the pledge, and the World Bank must also
feel that the government will take "robust measures to address the domes-
tic causes of bribery."8 0 Also, both agencies have adopted formal proce-
dures for reducing economic assistance to developing countries if
"government corruption is found to have an adverse effect on economic
development."8 '
Although the IMF and the World Bank base their decisions on eco-
nomic, not political, needs, they now consider corruption levels in their
decisions concerning aid to developing countries and aid packages they
74. Id. art. VI, § 1(a), (b).
75. See Wesberry, supra note 15, at 510.
76. See id.; see also Gantz, supra note 58, at 469.
77. See Gantz, supra note 58, at 469.
78. See Wesberry, supra note 15, at 510.
79. See Gantz, supra note 58, at 470.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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implement.8 2
Other organizations, such as the European Union, the United Nations,
the World Trade Organization and the International Chamber of Com-
merce, also have taken steps to combat international bribery.83
D. Transparency International
In other efforts against international corruption, Transparency Interna-
tional, a non-governmental organization whose members include former
government officials and businesspeople, is "dedicated to increasing gov-
ernment accountability and curbing both international and national cor-
ruption."8 4 Transparency International's most important actions concern
information gathering and raising public awareness. For instance, it pub-
lishes a Corruption Perceptions Index that scores companies on a ten-point
scale, a score of ten indicating a highly clean country and zero indicating a
highly corrupt country.85 Transparency International also publishes a
Bribery Index of Leading Exporting Nations to uncover the sources of brib-
ery by scoring countries on a ten-point scale with a score of ten indicating
negligible bribery and zero indicating very high levels of bribery.8 6
Il. Critics of the FCPA
While actions across the globe indicate that the majority of the global com-
munity supports efforts to curb international bribery, the FCPA and other
international efforts are not without their critics. Critics suggest that brib-
ery is common in many world markets and will not disappear anytime
soon; thus, any effort to stamp out corruption in those areas would prove
unsuccessful.8 7 Furthermore, one critic argues that even if FCPA-like legis-
lation were adopted by some countries, the FCPA itself is inherently flawed,
82. See Nora M. Rubin, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Cor-
ruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The legal Implications of the
OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and Switzerland,
14 Am. U. INr'L L. REv. 257, 278 (1998).
83. European Union-On May 26, 1997, the EU passed the EU Convention on the
Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials
of the Member States of the European Union.
United Nations-The U.N. passed a resolution against corruption on July 21, 1997.
World Trade Organization-In 1996 the WTO Ministerial Declaration established a work-
ing group to study transparency in government procurement practices. Non-governmen-
tal organizations that have followed suit include the following: Hong Kong based
Independent Commission Against Corruption; Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia;
National Whistleblower Center; the International Chamber of Commerce; the Institute
for International Economics; and the World Economic Forum.
For a detailed treatment of each, see George, supra note 46, at 39-46.
84. Transparency Int'l, Welcome! (visited Nov. 10, 2000) <http://www.transparency.
org/welcome.html>.
85. See id.
86. See Transparency Int'l, 1999 Bribe Payer Index: 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index
(visited Nov. 10, 2000) <http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/index.html>.
87. See Salbu, supra note 2, at 262.
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making enforcement difficult.88 More importantly, the critic contends that
any suggestion of a law, even one perfectly-written, designed to attack brib-
ery on a global level is inappropriate considering the structure of today's
global market.8 9
The most commonly used argument, however, against the FCPA-led
efforts to combat international bribery is that it constitutes moral imperial-
ism and overreaches into the sovereignty of individual countries. In effect,
the FCPA acts as a Western legal construct that superimposes its moral
identity and values on the rest of the world without recognizing the subtle
differences among the world's various cultures. As such, anti-bribery
efforts are offensive to other governments in that they presuppose a moral
highroad in comparison to the governments' actions. 90 Furthermore, the
global community has not reached a state where it can adhere to one set of
laws designed to combat bribery without cultural differences raising con-
cerns about moral consensus, which could lead to resentment and insur-
gence among countries. 9 1
Another criticism of the FCPA and its global influence comes from
Kenneth Surjadinata of Emory University. In his article, Revisiting Corrupt
Practices from a Market Perspective, Mr. Surjadinata argues that morally
derived laws, such as the FCPA, should not govern domestic firms' foreign
activities inasmuch as they have to do with corrupt practices. 92 As he
explains, the FCPA has two fundamental flaws: (1) its anti-bribery provi-
sions encounter difficulty in determining the contours of corrupt practices
and (2) its assertion of Western cultural values is intrusive to the sover-
eignty of foreign states.9 3
Mr. Surjadinata asserts that rather than using a value-based definition
of corrupt practices or corruption which is not universally applicable, laws
that deal with this subject matter should be governed by principles of effi-
ciency.9 4 In addition, the FCPA could be repealed in favor of a more relia-
ble approach-the market itself. The author advances the notion that the
global market itself will be able to govern corruption through its regulation
of inefficient practices.95 Most would agree that corrupt practices are inef-
ficient and, therefore, not welcome in the marketplace. Given basic market
principles, investors will choose the most efficient means to carry out their
goals and, if given the option, will not engage in bribery or other corrupt
88. See id. at 264-71. Salbu argues that, under the original Act and the 1988 Amend-
ments, the FCPA is ambiguous in its classification of payments as bribes and the defini-
tion of grease payments. In addition, the question whether a person is a public official
and whether a payment constitutes a bribe blurs as one changes cultures.
89. See Steven Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desira-
ble International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century?
Extraterritorial Restriction on Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global
Village, 24 YALE J. Ir'L L. 223, 224 (1999).
90. See Salbu, supra note 2, at 276.
91. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 231.
92. See Surijadinata, supra note 2, at 1023.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1024.
95. See id. at 1027.
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practices.96
IV. The FCPA in Court: Augmenting the Act's Transparency
The best example of the FCPA in action SEC v. Triton Energy Corporation.97
Filed in February 1997, Triton was the first FCPA civil enforcement action
the SEC brought in over a decade.98 The case involved payments to a for-
eign agent in Indonesia for an oil and gas concession operated and devel-
oped by Triton Indonesia, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Triton Energy
Corporation, a Texas-based multinational corporation, and an Indonesian
governmental agency.
The SEC alleged that Triton illegally made payments to Indonesian
government officials and concealed these payments by misstating the
records, books, and accounts of Triton Indonesia. 99 The case involved two
different proceedings. It was both a civil enforcement action against Triton
Energy and two fo2mer senior officers of Triton Indonesia and an adminis-
trative cease-and-desist proceeding against two former executives of Triton
Energy and two former managers of Triton Indonesia.
The case presents a paradigmatic example of the FCPA's applicability
to U.S. companies "utilizing the services of third party foreign agents."100
Several Indonesian government agencies received payments, which were
made through an intermediary. Not only were illegal and misreported pay-
ments involved, projects repeatedly failed to generate sufficient oil produc-
tion for the costs incurred. 1 1 Triton, therefore, highlights not only the
illegal nature of the payments, but also the economic inefficiencies of the
arrangement. Indeed, the fact that the case settled suggests that the FCPA
provides benefits of both an economic and legal nature.
This case emphasizes the "renewed prosecutorial interest in civil and
criminal enforcement of the foreign bribery/corrupt foreign payments pro-
visions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice. 1° 2 These recent
prosecutions show that the problem of corrupt foreign payments is not an
exaggeration. They involve payments by large U.S. firms that cannot be
mistaken for gifts.
Corporations have the option of forgoing corrupt practices by adher-
ing to market forces of inequality. They choose instead to engage in cor-
rupt practices regardless of the cost to their projects. These cases show
that the corrupt practices the FCPA prohibits have been around for a long
96. See id.
97. SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) a 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
98. See Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Con-
ducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Con-
sent Decree Settlements, 18 J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 303, 305 (1998).
99. See id. at 306.
100. Id. at 307.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 305.
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time. The FCPA aimed to prevent and redress the ills caused by corrupt
practices, which the market was unable to address.
U.S. courts have made an effort to rigorously define the FCPA's scope
and ensure a focused and effective weapon against corruption, a weapon
that champions transparency and economic efficiency. In United States v.
Leibo,10 3 for example, the court addressed what constitutes a gift or a bribe
and what is meant by "corruptly." In Leibo, a German company under
contract with the Nigerian government approached NAPCO International,
Inc. (NAPCO), requesting parts and maintenance for cargo planes at a time
when the Nigerian government began to have financial difficulties. 10 4 To
salvage the Nigerian project through its U.S. connection, NAPCO sought
financial assistance under the Foreign Military Sales Program.1 05 To
obtain approval from the Nigerian President, Richard Leibo, Vice President
of NAPCO, and a representative of the West German company met in Niger
with the chief of maintenance for the Nigerian Air Force. As a consequence
of the meeting, the chief of maintenance agreed to approach the President
of Niger.10 6
After the Nigerian President approved the contract, Leibo contacted
the chief's cousin, an embassy official in Washington, D.C., and offered to
make a "gesture."10 7 Soon after that meeting, the cousin set up a bank
account, in which NAPCO deposited thirty thousand dollars.' 0 8 Also,
using a NAPCO credit card, Leibo paid part of the cousin's honeymoon
airline tickets, amounting to more than two thousand dollars. 10 9 Eventu-
ally, NAPCO received two additional contracts from the Nigerian govern-
ment, totaling approximately three million dollars. 110
In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Interna-
tional,'11 "the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the act of state doctrine barred actions brought by a competitor against a
company that pled guilty to making payments in violation of the FCPA in
order to gain a contract."1 12 The Supreme Court found that where the alle-
gations involved no act of the foreign government, the Act of State Doctrine
applied; whether the contract was valid under Nigerian law was not an
issue in the case.1 13
The FCPA's intrusive scope was further limited in the Sixth Circuit
103. 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991); see Johnson, supra note 37, at 988.
104. See Johnson, supra note 37, at 988.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
112. Johnson, supra note 37, at 990. The Act of State doctrine is designed to avoid
judicial action that would impinge upon the foreign relations of the United States and
confers presumptive validity to certain acts of foreign sovereigns. SeeJoHNJ. BoNsIGouN,
LAW AND MULTINATIONALIsM: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 394
(1994); see also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (1983).
113. SeeJohnson, supra note 37, at 991.
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case Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 114 where the court rejected the contention
that the FCPA created a private right of action.1 1s  As a result, the case
operates as another limitation on the FCPA's intrusion into the customs
and traditions of foreign countries. In 1982, Phillip Morris subsidiaries
donated $12.5 million to The Children's Foundation of Venezuela, an
organization chaired by the Venezuelan president's wife. In return, Phillip
Morris gained price controls on Venezuelan tobacco, assurances that
existing tax rates applicable to tobacco companies would not be raised, and
other benefits.
The Sixth Circuit dismissed FCPA action in Lamb because the Act does
not permit private causes of action. The plaintiffs argued that although
none was expressly created, "congressional intent [to allow a private cause
of action] can be inferred from the language of the statute."1 16 However,
the court could find no foundation for the plaintiffs' argument. By limiting
prosecution under the FCPA to the Justice Department, Congress made a
deliberate judgment to respect political sensitivities, preserve the goodwill
of foreign governments, and reserve action for more willful and blatant
offenses.
Both Kirkpatrick and Lamb provide examples of actual limitations on
the FCPA's coverage. Both cases addressed whkther a private cause of
action exists for FCPA violations. Rejecting a private cause of action for
FCPA violations places a limit on the Act's effect, so that it may not be
overly intrusive toward foreign practices. The cases also serve another
function in that they publicize otherwise private actions. The mere fact
that a third party would bring an action against a company that violated
the FCPA evidences the discontent and frustration of honest companies
regarding corrupt practices. The plaintiffs in these cases likely did not con-
sider the practices as just "gifts" or believe that the market had adequately
addressed problems associated with corrxi1t practices. In fact, the plain-
tiffs were so unsatisfied with the governanef the market that they turned
to legal remedies to right the situation..*A_
Bolton v. Tesoro1 17 provides another perspective on the application of
the FCPA, but only tangentially. Tesoro was under investigation for illegal
payments made to Trinidad government officials who could enhance
Tesoro's interests in Trinidad's oil resources. Tesoro fully cooperated in the
SEC investigation. This case did not involve an SEC inquiry or racketeer-
ing activity that would link FCPA violations with other corrupt activities,
such as insider trading, commercial bribery, obstruction of justice, and
wire and mail fraud, to establish a pattern of illegality under the Racketeer-
ing Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act.118 Rather, the Tesoro court
considered the concerns of shareholders in a derivative action led by Bol-
114. 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
115. See Johnson, supra note 37, at 992; see also Bill Shaw, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: A Legal and Moral Analysis, 7 J. Bus. ETHics 789 (1988).
116. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028.
117. 871 F.2d 1266 (1989).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (b)-(d).
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ton that claimed the Tesoro board was attempting to take the company pri-
vate. By going private, the Board would eliminate inconvenient
shareholders, such as Bolton's group; lessen the scrutiny of federal watch-
dogs; and enhance its financial position. Therefore, the FCPA was not cen-
tral to the suit.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see how Tesoro supports the contention
that the FCPA, though well-intentioned, is an inappropriate way of combat-
ing bribery in the international marketplace. In an ideal world, local offi-
cials would deal with bribery, and nations of the world would pressure
others to action with high profile suits against offenders in their own juris-
dictions. In that world, there would be no imperialism, no disrespect for
customary ways of doing business, and "free" trade would progress as it
has for thousands of years. That would be the course of least resistance,
but it is a scenario for the ideal world, not the real one.
Recent cases document the new transparency available under the
FCPA. Without the Act and other international efforts, private under-the-
table activities would continue without consequences. For example,
Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford1 19 involved a criminal action against Craw-
ford and Crawford's unsuccessful efforts to force Petroleos Mexicanos
(Pemex) to comply with a subpoena. 120 Although not the centerpiece of
this case, the FCPA revealed this transaction, making it more likely that
those involved would be punished; that outcome would not occur absent
the Act.
These transactions diminish freedom and fairness in international
trade. While criminal activities may be rampant in Mexico, there is little
reason to believe that Mexican citizens are at ease with the fact that certain
officials fatten their pocketbooks at the working people's expense. The
FCPA plays a positive role in bringing transparency to the bargaining table
and exposing corruption. Otherwise, illicit transactions would pass unno-
ticed, and the informational requirements of a free market would be fur-
ther diminished.
Since the passage of the 1998 Amendments, few new actions have
been brought under the FCPA, evidencing the need for the Amendments
and additional transparency.1 21 One scholar concluded that national regu-
lation of transnational bribery is not immoral:122 "Criminalization of
transnational bribery simply involves a country prohibiting its citizens and
their employees from engaging in conduct in another country that is illegal,
destructive, and socially condemned" at home.123 This criminalization
119. 826 F.2d 392 (1987).
120. Id. at 394. Crawford and six other individuals were indicted for multiple FCPA
violations.
121. See Stuart Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 33 INr' LAw. 507, 513 (1999)
(summarizing two new cases brought under the FCPA- United States v. Tannenbaum and
United States v. Crites).
122. See id.
123. Id.
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does not constitute moral imperialism. Indeed, to allow such conduct is
morally questionable.
V. Justification for Anti-Corruption Measures
Literature critiquing the FCPA and progeny focuses on several points,
including the intrusiveness of these measures on local traditions, in partic-
ular on gift-giving, and their detrimental effects on efficiency. Some urge
that Congress repeal the FCPA124 because "assuming, arguendo, that
ninety percent of all corrupt practices are inefficient, the [FCPA] would still
include ten percent of practices that are efficient."1 25 These are not dismis-
sive concerns. The FCPA's framers never intended to criminalize legitimate
gift-giving-public tokens of esteem; gifts offered as symbols of friendship,
not demanded in return for special favors; and gestures of appreciation
such as those frequently described by Professor Salbu. No one has been
prosecuted under the FCPA for these innocent behaviors. Only a tortured
reading of successful prosecutions could result in that determination.
Market-oriented critics of the FCPA, and presumably the OAS, OECD,
IMF, and World Bank initiatives, insist that the inefficiencies of corrupt
practices will effect the needed social and legal reform. Yet, if the market is
so effective in eliminating every inefficiency, why has the market not done
this already? International trade and the force of efficient investment in the
global marketplace have existed for a long time. The FCPA is a relatively
new addition, and the OECD and OAS counterparts are even more recent.
It is unlikely that unilateral and cooperative action can and will facilitate
sufficient market pressure to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, cor-
rupt practices and their drag on the world economy.
The aspirations of anti-corruption measures find strong support in the
work of an influential philosopher, Jiirgen Habermas.126 Habermas wrote
of the crisis that may ensue from a possible disjunction between or among
two or more "systems" that are experienced in every country and corner of
the globe.127 These systems are recognized as the state, the economy, and
the socio-cultural complex in which the citizens of that nation live and
work. 128 Corruption, such as bribing public officials with special favors to
gain contracts, results in a crisis for each of the three principal systems.
Bribery threatens the state's credibility and stability. It undermines
the economy's productivity, and every religious and moral code discour-
ages it.129 Most legal codes prohibit bribery because it assaults the worth
124. See Surjadinata, supra note 2, at 1027, 1085.
125. Id. at 1024-25.
126. Habermas was a German philosopher who is the most prominent heir of Critical
Theory associated with the Frankfurt School. He is widely acclaimed in the United
States for his contributions to Critical Legal Theory. SeeJORGEN HABEuMAS, LEGITIMATION
Caisis (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975).
127. See generally id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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and integrity of the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker. 130 If a characterization
as "shameful" is not self-evident, one must wonder why bribery, without
exception, is secretive and private and conducted in clandestine ways. 131
The coercive impact of the FCPA and the OAS, OECD, IMF, andWorld
Bank efforts is an undeniable reality, but this feature appears in every other
public measure designed to combat harmful behavior. Habermas and
other members of the Frankfurt school patterned these cooperative
projects on the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant formulated the concept of a
"categorical imperative," 132 which, in many ways, is a secularized version
of the "Golden Rule."133 In Kant's view, everyone labors to act in ways
prompted by a "good will."134 This formulation of moral conduct relies
heavily on good intent.135 Not all moral or religious codes build on this
foundation, but many are anchored in a concept of intent that is deeply
respected, if not acted on, globally. 136
Habermas seeks to elevate the notion of a General Will' 3 7 -a univer-
sal, rationally justified concept of the "good" to a level comparable to
Kant's categorical imperative. 138 Habermas' General Will, however, has no
metaphysical status;139 it would not resemble Plato's world of "forms."140
To the contrary, the General Will is simply a rationally-determined, human
fabrication with numerous frailties and miscues, but where the creative
process is central. The General Will is the product of multiple inputs
voiced voluntarily and absent coercion. 141
The "ideal speech situation" is a product of Habermas' intellectual cre-
ativity.' 42 Habermas understands that this scenario is unattainable
because the realities of the world intrude in numerous ways. There is the
problem of coercion, which exists in Habermas' view whenever a more
powerful or successful entity exerts pressure on the speaker. The pressure
need not be physical threats; it could be far subtler, such as withholding or
diminishing an offered, but never promised or committed, favor. Anything
that detracts from speech that most people would regard as free and unin-
hibited, including anything that hinders a person's confidence or skill in
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. IMMANUEL KANT, GRouNDxWoRK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 88 (HJ. Paton
trans., 1964).
133. Matthew 7:12, Luke 631, Leviticus 19:18.
134. KANT, supra note 132, at 17.
135. See HABm ts, supra note 126.
136. David Hume, a Scottish philosopher who was the polar opposite of Kant and a
forerunner of consequentialism (utility), would regard harmful conduct as bribery with
moral disapproval. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
(Tom L. Beauchamp ed., 1998) (1771).
137. See generally HABERmAs, supra note 126.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Bk. vii, 514-18.
141. HABERmAS, supra note 126.
142. Id.
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articulation-for example, a barrier to education through an inferior
school system, produces a situation that is less than "ideal."
The ideal speech situation allows for a progressive fine-tuning of moral
injunctions. Kant's categorical imperative was in effect "written in stone."
The word categorical meant "no argument, no questions," and imperative
meant "something you must do without exception."1 43 Habermas' scena-
rio allows the free play of ideas and modification of the initial position over
time. In the context of eliminating or at least diminishing corruption in
international trade, the initial position could easily be "let the market do
it."144 Over time, if that position seemed ineffectual, reasonable people
might opt for change, such as tightening controls or some other means of
dealing with the problem.
For international politics and international trade, the ideal speech sit-
uation is not likely to emerge in its pristine form. United Nations debate
and action within its sphere of influence would be the closest thing to
approximate it, and that context could in a sense be replicated in the OAS,
the OECD, and the U.S. Congress. Keeping with Habermas' proposition,
gifts-if an agreement delineated its components-could be an exception,
but not an exception that swallows the rule. Efficiency, or the economic
imperative to utilize public and private goods in the most productive way,
would also be a prime consideration. The FCPA may be considered "coer-
cive" on both of these grounds, but it remains to be seen whether spokespe-
ople for those points of view can articulate their critiques persuasively.
From Habermas' perspective, speakers are not constrained in voicing a
position or engaging in a political or legal movement until the "ideal" situa-
tion emerges. He does not advance a social contract built on a rock solid
foundation. Habermas simply takes us as we are-in a real world with real
problems and resources-and puts all his faith in the depth and creativity
of human rationality. In this sense, his work is consistent with the long
tradition of German idealism. It is not a foolproof scheme and it is not
presented as foolproof. Trial and error are part of this approach, as they
are in every effort of democratic regimes to eliminate harms to the body
politic, economic productivity, and the cultural fabric of society on a global
scale.
Conclusion
Bribery will disappear simply by putting new laws on the books. Also, if it
is true that bribery is most prevalent in those quarters of the globe exper-
iencing the greatest impoverishment, measures that produce an increase in
global wealth-even if the wealth only trickles down-will contribute to a
reduction in bribery and other forms of corruption. The FCPA and prog-
eny are steps in that direction.
If poverty is the root cause of bribery, or a significant contributing
factor, and if bribery and other forms of corruption are counterproductive
143. Id.
144. Id.
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to economic growth, one has to ask what are the alternatives. A politically
feasible redistribution of global wealth, or Western wealth, runs the gamut
from "cultural exchange" to outright transfer payments. Yet wealth trans-
fers are forever under political attack, which is not likely to change in the
foreseeable future.
The FCPA, and the OECD and OAS counterparts, may be among the
few politically feasible ways of dealing with a problem that is widely
regarded as economically devastating. That Western firms still invest in
countries widely acknowledged as corrupt suggests the potential for more
foreign investment, much more in terms of a domestic product, than could
be gained if bribery and corruption were eliminated or at least brought
under control. It may be the case, though unlikely, that U.S. and related
anti-corruption measures intrude on traditional notions of gift-giving in
various parts of the world, but one cannot help notice that these occasions
have not been so striking or intrusive as to prompt an official protest from
foreign governments. Cases reviewed in this inquiry do no more than
reveal illicit payments by U.S. firms and employees. If some cultures con-
sider these payments mere gifts, the transparency that FCPA actions bring
should cause no consternation.
Instead, the world has witnessed Prime Minister Tanaka's dismissal
for accepting Lockheed's secret payments, which were partially financed by
$250 million in U.S.-guaranteed loans in the early 1970s. Political reper-
cussions were also documented in connection with Northrup's payments to
highly placed Saudi Air Force officials; Gulfs contributions from a
Bahaman subsidiary to a political party in the Republic of Korea and the
President of Bolivia; Exxon's funneling of between $46 and $49 million
from Esso Italiana to Italian officials for special favors; and Mobil Oil Ital-
iana's, a Mobil Oil subsidiary, similar actions through the offices of a trade
association, Unione Petrolifera.
For the United States to respect the laws and customs of other nations,
these nations should grant the U.S. legal system equal regard. As review of
cases illustrated, there is scarce resemblance between corrupt payment and
anything approximating a gift. Moreover, no scholar assailing the U.S.,
OECD, and OAS efforts suggests a middle ground. Amendments to the
FCPA do not come easily, but, recently, Congress considered a provision to
exempt modest payments that might be termed gifts even if those payments
were not positively or affirmatively endorsed by the written laws of the
host nation. Congress will likely reconsider the provision, and it might
look favorably on scholarly works that explore middle-ground positions.
Repeal of the FCPA is not a realistic proposition. If repeal were placed
on the congressional agenda, one could only imagine opposition from all
points of the globe. If the largest and most aggressive economic competitor
in the world economy sanctioned bribery and "leveled the playing field" by
allowing bribe payments to be deducted as legitimate business expenses,
the protests would be unbridled; in fact, they would be heard in the halls of
U.S. academia.

